Civil Society Rejected – Structural Pathways and Historical Evidence from Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria

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Civil society in Central-Eastern Europe – what does it stand for and why it is under attack?

Despite short term optimism about developments of liberal democracy in Eastern Europe expressed by many after the EU accession of Poland and Hungary, and later Bulgaria, present political situation put to the test predictions about their unidirectional path. Among the growing catalog of breaches against the rule of law and liberal minimum performed by the Hungarian and Polish governments, there are also attempts to subsume the sphere of social activity hitherto not dependent on the present governments. Various legal means, targeted controls and skewed relocation of state funding severely undermined the existence of civil society organizations (CSOs) in these countries (Mesežnikov, Gyárfášová, and Smilov 2008; Kabakchieva and Kurzydlowski 2012; Vandor et al. 2017; Warso and Godzisz 2006; Wessenauer and Hunyadi 2016; Human Rights First 2017).

This rejection of CSO’s as important element of the functional modern society and the corresponding attack is not, however, a detached attempt performed for pragmatic reasons by state functionaries. Ostracism in discourse, cuts and relocations of funding and legal action are not only aimed to remove the external checks, or place various sorts of clients in dependent but lucrative positions. These steps are complicit with the broader ideological agenda, and the actual platform on which the ruling political formations build their support at the ballot. Civil society as a vehicle of liberal democracy, sphere of activities directed at empowering excluded groups, questioning discriminatory practices or lobbying for environment-friendly solutions is on a firing line and voting constituencies seem to support this offensive. The language used to forge weapons in this battle is not new and is fully complicit with a broader architecture of Eastern European nationalist populism.

Investigating historical embedding of this language and its resonance among local societies may shed light on the ongoing processes and assist in finding a way to counteract these tendencies. Correspondingly, the aim of this paper is to analyze the past practices of ostracism and loss of citizenship under changing political regimes in Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria. In the next step I will compare them analytically to the methods and rhetorics of today's politicians who attack and undermine critical civil society voices. Historical knowledge of the messages and methods used by various regimes and ideologies in the past are used to de-construct analytically contemporary pressure against human-rights, environmentalist and pro-democracy organizations
Historical studies explicitly investigating the prehistory of civil society as a social practice, and broader overviews of developments within public spheres of the region are either narrowly focused on case studies or investigate conceptual histories of sorts (Lewis 1992; Hildermeier, Kocka, and Conrad 2000; Götz and Hackmann 2003; Janowski 2003; Rittersporn and Behrends 2003; Pollack and Wielgohs 2004; Hackmann and Roth 2011). Not many of them address long term developments (Bermeo and Nord 2000), yet less conceptualize encroachments against civil society, with the exception of those scrutinizing repressive imperial states in the region.

Addressing this lacuna this paper presents a narrative analysis of three cases. Historically evolving civic spheres are presented against structural backdrop of their developments; relationship to the state, social composition of involved actors and the main cleavages organizing political struggles. There is no easy way to synthesize the existing knowledge in a way informative for the present day questions. Any broader historical study has to justify the always arbitrary streamlining of historical material. My aim is to reveal contexts responsible for the relative vulnerability of civil societies in the region and determining the shape of the present attacks on them and their broader resonance.

A brief look at the arguments used to ostracize civil society actors by the nationalist-populist governments shows that indeed they found broader resonance. They successfully targeted alleged enemies of the community, not only in the eyes of party leaders but also broader voting constituencies. They seem to share the proposed definitions of out-groups and in-groups; the latter allegedly represented by the ruling parties uttering the critique and imposing legal measures against CSOs (usually claiming to represent the whole national body, as populist discourse often does, see Müller 2016). Hence, it is useful to scrutinize a broader context of such discursive configurations. They are not coming out of the blue; they have their own histories and do build upon wide spread visions of social structure, often manifestly untrue, but nevertheless real for their holders. As powerful political cleavages they carry distorted images of actual social conflicts.

**What is civil society?**

When tackling this issue, the first challenge to be faced is a multiplicity of definitions of civil society. It’s not easy to bridge the gap between their present normative entanglements and reliable historical analysis. The notion of civil society owned its revival to the fruitful
transnational exchange between discourses and practices produced by Eastern European dissidents and Western intellectuals (von Beyme 2000; Arndt and Gawin 2008). This embedding, however, did not stimulate major research on actual histories of civil society institutions in the region. These institutions were, and are, much different in respect to the Western context, which was the initial background to coin the concept of civil society (Dunn and Hann 2004). As Jan Kubik noted, “the ever-changing and often tension-ridden interaction between the concept and the realities within which it emerged (the modern West) and to which it is sometimes employed (non-Western contexts)” instead of orienting research practice, often produce ideological distortions (2015, see also Hann 2000; Hackmann and Roth 2011).

In order to avoid such a misleading universalism of the concept of civil society, it is here used as a general descriptive category, with definite conceptual genesis characterizing any analytical term (Załęski 2012), albeit generalizable above its initial uses (Kocka et al. 2001; Janowski 2003). On a basic level I understand civil society as a sphere of associations and institutions, not being part of the state, based on “ordered, nonclandestine, and collective activities” (Bermeo and Nord 2000), which are able to generate critical potential regarding to the state and but also in respect to themselves. This generic definition ought not to be substantialized and filled with too much site-specific content (Kubik 2015) or normative element (as in Calhoun 1992; for critique see Kopecky and Mudde 2012).

These practices and institutions form a social sphere which is highly relational in respect to other domains of social and political practice. Just like the concept of civil society has been historically changing, what could be referred to as civil society is also historically contingent. Moreover, not every configuration of state, political power, social classes or family structure facilitates the emergence of civic cooperation, and this variance opens the space for comparative historical research (Kocka et al. 2001). In the same time, instead of looking for those practices which constituted a historical civil society fitting the assumed and often ahistorically applied definition, it is better to ask about the present space for action delimited by past structural configurations and their historically unfolding outcomes.

**Civil society, state and political cleavage**

Historical sociologists have investigated the relationship between the state and civil society – the latter being a factor facilitating the development of the independent sphere of reasoning.
The fully-fledged civic sphere could emerge after the demise of absolutist monarchies. On the other hand, though, the shape of civil society has been consequential for the further development of the state structures. The major historical factor was the trajectory of social modernization. In line with the classic depiction of social origins of democracy (Moore 2003), it is argued that the concessionary attitude of the old landed elites and political inclusion of peasantry facilitated emergence of democratic polity, parliamentarism, and in consequence emergence of civic institutions under the auspices of bourgeois hegemony (Bermeo and Nord 2000). Such path was viable in conditions of a stable statehood with sovereign power not questioned on a territorial level. In such cases rising nationalism was funneled into liberal, pro-state patriotism and gradually accommodated new social groups – but was not busy questioning state unites as such. The stabilization of state-based unity preceded democratization; thus conflicts might have been defined in class terms and represented in the emerging party system. Progressive parties representing popular classes were struggling for generalization of the political community.

Contrary to this “Western” idealized model, in Eastern Europe the national self-assertion, generalization of citizenship, and negotiation of class conflict did not proceed consecutively but simultaneously (Bonnell 1983). Class conflict was displaced and entangled with counter-imperial, national self-assertion. Political groupings were dispersed and conflicted along national and ethnic lines. This inhibited political institutions capable of mediating inequalities in wealth and political participation (Bunce 2000). The accumulated struggles were additionally heated up by import of ideas coined within the different temporality of the West, a condition once dubbed as contemporaneity of the non-contemporaneous (Bloch 1977).

Within large imperial states of Central and Eastern Europe civil society institutions emerged in the context of strives for national self-assertion. It was no longer an embodiment of civic socialities populating utopian landscapes of liberal visionaries (as portrayed by Habermas 1989). In inter-ethnic and multi-national imperial contexts associational culture was catering for conflicted nationalized groups and delivered an important vehicle of democratic nationalism (S.-L. Hoffmann 2006; Anderson 2006). Eastern European associations and professional bodies developed not instead of, but because of (lacking) legal guaranties for the autonomy of the civil sphere in relation to the state.

Contrary to a widely held conviction, Eastern Europe should not be seen in terms of lacking institutions (in comparison to the imaginary West). The lacking conditions for civil society as
seen by influential theoreticians (Arato and Cohen 1988; Cohen and Arato 1992), did not prevent a thriving associational sphere to emerge. However, its characteristics and relationship to the state was much different. It was either directly oppositional, i.e. founded not as a parallel alternative but as an active actor questioning the state, or directly concessioned by autocratic administration (See Hackmann 2003; Bradley 2009, respectively). As a result, civil society cannot be taken as a unitary, universal concept or practice carrying stable set of values. It is more a set of historically situated practices, connected by “family resemblance” (Bauerkämper 2003) but often playing structurally different roles and possibly serving directly contradicting political goals (Berman 1997; Armony 2004).

This heterogeneity has been noted by sociologists scrutinizing the contemporary civil society of Eastern Europe. Previous research have often lamented the deficiencies of regional civic activities, additionally underscored by the alleged spectacular robustness of alternative civil society in the final years of state socialism (Lomax 1997a; Staniszkis 1999; Howard 2003). More recent studies were more interested in various form of activity not fitting the idealized form of associational life or NGO’s proselytizing liberal values. Various forms of “uncivil society” and contentious politics entered the scope of interest (Kopecky and Mudde 2012), along with the intensified study of legacies left by associational life during socialism (Rittersporn and Behrends 2003; Lane 2005; Ekiert and Kubík 2014). This lead to the conclusion that what came after state socialism was not a rebirth of civil society from scratch, but a process within which “new and old organizational forms and types of civic engagement coexist, combine, and sometimes compete within a transforming political, social and economic environment” (Jacobsson and Korolczuk 2017, 6). Such a refocus stimulated the revisit of theoretical categories in favor of more descriptive, and non-normative understanding of civil society.

The link between civil society and democracy has been weakened. The inclusion of various anti-state or anti-democratic contentious activities demonstrated the difficulty with setting the limits between civil society as a desired supplement of democratic polity and its “uncivil” counterpart undermining democratic principles. This problem touches the sensitive nerve both within the neo-Tocquevillian tradition, seeing in associational life a hotbed for thriving democracy (Putnam 2001), and the Eastern European dissident tradition envisioning civil society as an antidote for totalitarian ambitions of the socialist state (Arndt 2007).

This conundrum actually demonstrates the ultimate discrepancy of those traditions. They
are often conflated as seemingly the term civil society in a common to both of them. However, a
closer look reveals that they may lead to contradictory empirical implications. Tocqueville was
fascinated with American associational life as a feeding soil for active citizenship, and admired
active interaction of citizens with the state (Tocqueville 2012; S. Hoffmann 2003; Mastnak
2006). In comparison, the understanding of civil society as a driving force of democratization
was much different in the writings of Eastern European dissidents. They tried to conceptually
grasp their struggle with the state socialist states. Here civil society was not facilitating
participation and the interaction with the state but was an allegedly apolitical site of resistance
against the state (Krauz-Mozer and Borowiec 2007; Arndt 2007). Moreover, when collective
activity is considered as enhancing civility, it is impossible to draw a line separating the pro-
democratic movements from those pushing rival ideas. All of them stimulate certain cultures of
cooperation. On the other hand, within the second tradition, it is troublesome to differentiate the
state to be resisted from the one which is already (or still) democratic and should not be
irresponsibly questioned. How can one conceptualize the historical lineages of civil society
against a backdrop of this normative conundrum, and asses the attacks on its emanations
nowadays?

The way out of this puzzle is a historically sensitive, sociological conceptualization of civil
society as relationally nested in a set of institutions and social structure. Whether civil society
acts in favor of democracy is dependent on its structural embedding. Not only is the relationship
to the state, and the political face of this state, what matters. The nature of prevailing social
conflicts and capacity of civil society to bridge conflicted social entities determines its
democratic capacities. If civil society institutions are able to mediate between groups on the
opposed sides of the class cleavage (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) and generally bind people
associated with different sets of interests, they carry a democratic potential. If, conversely, civil
society actions perpetuate cleavages and increase the atomization of society by, for instance
putting forward the narrowly defined interest of some sector of society, the repercussions are the
opposite (Foley and Edwards 1996). The capacity of mediation and bridging is in turn highly
dependent on explicit articulation of class interests and the inexistence of strong cultural or
national grievances and emotions mobilizing people in different directions (Bartolini 2000; Eley
2002). Thus, the character of main political cleavages defines the role of civil society, and may be
a background for its perception, and hence, successful marginalization. In itself, it is dependent
on structural configuration of classes, estates and status groups, or the shape of the field of power.

The field of power is a crucial concept used by a sociologist, Pierre Bourdieu in order to grasp power relations in general, understood as “the space of the relations of force between the different kind of capital, or more precisely, between the agents who possess the sufficient amount of one of the different kinds of capital to be in position to dominate the corresponding field” (Bourdieu 1998, 34; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1993). In other words, it is there where dominant political discourses in any society are forged, “where all types of elites in a given society meet, battle, and negotiate their interests legitimizing, in effect, the common, unconscious national frame of social relations in any society” (Zarycki, Smoczyński, and Warczok 2017, 362). The crucial step I propose is to scrutinize the movable space which is occupied by civil society (both as practice and as discursive object) in this field. Such analysis discloses the bridging capacities of CSOs or groups which are their stakeholders. In a word, it describes the position of CSOs in relations to dominating political cleavages. This allows me to study the background of ostracism against civil society and its broader resonance.

Putting it into more operational terms, I argue that the attacks on civil society are often nested in the shape of political debate reflecting on the actual social structure of the given polity. Their resonance is grounded in a feeling shared among considerate social groups that civil society acts as centrifugal, alien force in respect to their alleged community. It may be an entirely misdirected criticism, but it nevertheless expresses perceptions of political cleavage. Not every political narrative grips adherents; many political entrepreneurs try to push rival vocabularies, but only some of them succeed. Any political interpellation has its conditions of felicitousness. Only then the political message resonates with considerate parts of the population, when it addresses some important demands and build upon already widespread basic convictions. This set of relationships may be roughly illustrated by a graph containing vertically structured, mutually dependent “layers”.
The task of this study is to present three historical narratives, allowing me to tentatively fill in the slots of this graph. Having done that, it will be possible to map out the respective fields of power and relative placement of civil society practice and discourse. Historically analyzing emerging cleavages and structural position of civil society actors, I will shed light on the reasons why attacks on civil society do emerge in particular form and gain a considerate support. This, in turn, may help to conceptualize possible responses.

*The curse of society fighting for a national self-assertion - Poland*

The research on civil society in Poland can be roughly divided into two camps, envisioning differently its role and significance. More recent research tends to stress actual practices of self-organization and associational culture, not referred to any normative benchmark or democratic teleology (Ekiert and Kubik 2014; Kubik 2015; Jacobsson and Korolczuk 2017). However, within the tradition more entrenched within the Polish mainstream sociology, civil society has been envisioned among the universal panacea for democratization on the way out of state
Correspondingly, the occidentalist common knowledge of the social science has been busy with bemoaning the lacks of Polish social activism associated with the legacy of state socialism. It was often seen as foreign imposition on Polish civility, trumping the blossoming flowers of the civic thought and activity (Poboży 2007; Sztompka 1993, 1996; Staniszkiš 1999). In a broader historical overview this argument incorporates the legacy of partitions. The subsuming of the Polish population under three imperial powers in the 19th century has been the reason for anti-state attitudes and distrust to civic activity (Kowalewski 1991; Markiewicz 2010; Sowa 2012). This discourse forged several keywords, repeated as ready-made tokens no longer carrying much analytical meaning.

For instance, the 1970’s sociologist, Stefan Nowak, described “sociological void”, an empty space between the socialist state and family units, which in Polish society was not filled by intermediary associational sphere (Nowak 1980). This argument was later recirculated countless times to justify the weakness of civil society after 1989 (for critical re-assessment see Pawlak 2015). The foreignness of the state combined with the withdrawal to the family and a long-bred drive to the national self-assertion against the state. The result was a bipolar affiliation to the family, which created practical loyalty, and imagined allegiance to the nation, which after all hardly created practical responsibilities, as legal action, adherence to the rule of law, or citizens’ patriotism (Dzwończyk 2009). This combination has been held responsible for a particular form of nationalist “amoral familialism”, a term drawn from research on southern Italian deficiencies of the rule of law (Banfield 1967) and willingly applied to the Polish case. It has been recently resurrected in critical analyses of the neo-feudal work-place culture and the revival of facade nationalism (Leder 2014).

All these components were referred to a broader cultural configuration of a foreign-imposed immaturity of the homini sovietici, another token term widely present among Westernizing, mainstream sociology of the 90’s. It replaced class analysis with functional theory of stratification and cultural criticism targeted at the popular classes as obstacles for capitalist modernization (for critical reassessment see Woźniak 2014; Ost 2015a, 2015b).

Although in many forms such argumentation is highly ideologized, the history of the state is certainly an important factor rendering the place possible to be occupied by civil society institutions. Some of the arguments will be reassessed below. However, I want to focus on more
structural explanations and trace the main cleavages within Polish society and polity. I am
interested in their possible repercussions on the level of symbolic organization of the current
public sphere, within which CSO’s were criticized, rejected and captured.

**The vagaries of distorted modernization. The prehistory of the Polish public sphere**

There is no singular path of development of the public sphere and civil society. However,
in rough comparison with the Western European pattern, epitomized by the Habermasian ideal-
typical, but also normative, model (Habermas 1989), it can be said that in Central and Eastern
Europe, the development of the public sphere and civil society, followed much different pattern.
The reasons lay both in particular historical background and the then-present political
circumstances. The developmental trajectory of the region was determined by different economic
paths than in the West, however both were already closely integrated (Małowist 2010). In
addition, in the Kingdom of Poland in the late 19th and early 20th centuries this process was
directly muffled by political autocracy and national suppression.¹

The agrarian nature of the country, the widespread illiteracy of popular classes, the political
weakness and small number of bourgeoisie, and finally – the domination of Szlachta and noble-
origin Church hierarchy in narrow-minded public life – all these factors inhibited the
development of institutions commonly associated with the emerging bourgeois civil society. The
Szlachta's manors, which were the real centres of public life in Poland, rather represented a court
lifestyle. Thus, there was no distinction between the private and the public, so the entire edifice
conditioning the ethos of individuals acting in public sphere, typical for the Western bourgeoisie,
did not emerge (Tazbir 1978). Even the very notion of citizen (obywatel) was tightly connected
with the land ownership and the culture of the manor house (Janowski 2003). Under these
circumstances, the development of an early modern Western type of civil society and its
characteristic institutions was highly improbable.

In the Russian-controlled Kingdom of Poland, the 1864 agrarian reforms pushed thousands
of now free, but unemployed peasants as well as bankrupted nobles from rural areas to cities. The

¹ The fragment below is a reworked version of an analysis presented in (Marzec and Śmiechowski 2016)
latter started to develop rapidly because of the rapid pace of industrialization (Nietyksza 1986). Not surprisingly, this period of impressive industrialization, supported by Russian trade protectionism, dramatically remodelled both the existing social structure and the nature of Polish politics. The second half of the 19th century was a time of intensive class formation in the Kingdom of Poland, resulting in the appearance of new social agents: capitalist bourgeois, an industrial working class and urban intelligentsia.

What distinguished the new social structure of urban areas was that they were controlled almost exclusively by German-born and Jewish bourgeoisie. With a partial exception of the former capital, Warsaw, this tendency was strong enough to prevent cultural Polonization and generally indifferent to Polish national strivings (Żarnowska 2004). Researchers of the Central European civil society have noted the importance of local publics for emerging counter-imperial nationalisms (S.-L. Hoffmann 2006), and the strong polarization of urban public spheres along national and ethnic divisions (Hofmann and Wendland 2002). Consequently, nationalistic Polish intellectuals regarded the urban non-Polish elites rather as a threat than as agents of economic and social modernization (Śmiechowski 2014b; Zysiak 2014). This polarized setting intensely influenced the rising modern Polish public sphere and shape of civil society formed under the auspices of the local intelligentsia.

**The public sphere of the intelligentsia**

When the centre of the Polish civic activity moved from manors to cities after 1863, economic elites, formed mostly by Jews and Germans, did not assume the mantle of opinion-makers. This position had become occupied by the intelligentsia, which appeared to be the only group able to replace szlachta as the predominant creators of socio-political and cultural discourse and public opinion. The former was often direct descendants of the latter, and inherited many cultural legacies of the noble class (Chałasiński 1947). It was neither a bourgeois intellectual elite nor a middle-class composed of professionals more common in Western European societies (Kocka and Mitchell 1993; Frykman and Löfgren 1987). Intelligentsia used to be sometimes defined as an underspecified “sphere of society” (Czepulis-Rastenis 1973), with specific “ethos”, calling or vocation to social service, but also important “missionary” attitudes (Walicki 2006). What allegedly characterized this group was the strong self-identity and certain exclusiveness despite close links to other social strata (Micińska 2008). As Tomasz Zarycki
notes, the major factor constituting the intelligentsia in this part of Europe was cultural capital, derived from the level of education. The bourgeoisie had economic capital on their disposal, but was deprived of the social recognition which limited its real powers (Zarycki 2008) and prevented the intelligentsia from cooperation with the financial elites (Janowski 2003).

The result was a narrowness and factionalism of the civic sphere, participation in which was limited to a small number of literate members of the intelligentsia, old aristocratic and Church elites, and the meek Polish bourgeoisie. The members of the radical intelligentsia considered themselves missionaries of progress, leading the lower classes to a better future. This, paradoxically, also inhibited the actual inclusiveness of the public sphere (Sdvizkov 2006; Iwańska 2006). It caused the relations between the enlightened elites – represented by intelligentsia – and the masses, especially workers, to take on a very paternalistic nature. As a result, almost the entire Kingdom's social and political discourse manifested a supposed universality, despite the fact that it hardly represented anything besides the intelligentsia's particular standpoint (for comparison and general logic of the process see Kocka and Muller-Luckner 1986; Kocka 2015, chap. 6).

The corresponding mode of thinking was to a large extent anti-political. It is worth noting that the Polish elites, with a minuscule exception of aristocratic loyalists, generally refused to cooperate with the tsarist state, seen unanimously as foreign, threatening, uncivilized and hostile. Indeed, Russian policies in the Kingdom of Poland left much less place for civic activity than in mainland Russia. Thus, even a moderate development of state-licensed civil society institutions was virtually non-existent (contrary to situation in Russia, see Bradley 2002, 2009). Consequently, the rift between state and the (non-existent) civil society was stronger than elsewhere. What developed, in the context of Western absolutist monarchies, as a civil alternative to a sovereign state (Koselleck 1988), or concessioned sub-sphere facilitating the development of knowledge (S.-L. Hoffmann 2006), in Poland could remain a prospective vision very detached from any serious political activity.

What mushroomed in abundance, however, were various forms of tightly-knitted networks of clandestine activity as political agitation or alternative patriotic teaching (Miąso 1960; Mencwel 2009; Cywiński 2010). Subscribers of magazines or newspapers could read that something important should be done in the whole country or in their hometowns, but in actuality no one had the courage to indicate those responsible for the status quo. Unsurprisingly, the real
results of these ‘actions’ were very modest and disappointing (Śmiechowski 2014a). The developed visions of the moral order of public activity prevented it from including non-prescribed phenomena, both from above (state politics) and below (a popular contentious public).

In the same time, the community of belonging was in a growing extend defined through ethnicity, as it was not possible to build civic identity mediated by the state or any idea of a political nation (Walicki 1989; Porter 2000). In these circumstances the liberals, if not strictly speaking elitist, aimed at spreading knowledge among the people until they reached the “entry conditions” of rational public participation. This ‘plan’ could simply not have worked during the rapid rise of mass politics.

Following the rapid entrance of the popular classes into politics during the 1905 revolution, Polish enlightened elites remained almost helpless (Blobaum 1995). The “fear of the masses” (Balibar, Stolze, and Giancotti 1989) intensified in a way which prevented the Polish liberal intelligentsia from acknowledging and recognizing the proletarian civic activity. The long strive for public recognition of popular classes in England or France was marked by gradual polemics, with proletarian contenders raising claims and renegotiating with a still not ossified capitalist order (Thompson 1963; Steinberg 1999; Lottes 1979; Aminzade 1993; Sewell 1980). In such circumstances, it was possible for emerging elites to at least partially recognize their claim for political visibility. The oligarchic elites of the ancien regime and nouveau riche bourgeois alike were eagerly trying to define the situation in their own way, however it was not possible to fully preclude and dismiss the proletarian claims and the plebeian public as the mere inarticulate calls of an uneducated mob (Eley 1992). In Russian Poland it was much easier to make this distinction, and the progressive milieus were able to neglect the proletarian public at ease, excluding the democratic tendency brought about by popular struggle (Marzec 2016b).

It seems that “foreign” tutelage of the Polish people, i.e. the workers driven by Jewish or foreign socialist agitators, was easier to admit than a redistribution of social leadership. Thus, it was a stock explanation at hand, helping to comprehend the new, “unbelievable” political agency. This general structure of explanation blazed the path for various Jewish conspiracy theories that gradually came to the fore. They addressed the same need to explain what was unexplainable from the elitist point of view. By rendering the masses as unavoidably passive and reactive, they built upon the same scaffolding as the more benign ethos of social mission and tutelage.
Nationalists take over

When the liberals lost the ground under their feet, facing socialist contention and popular demands, the nationalist party, so called National Democracy gained the upper hand (Krzywiec 2013; Marzec 2016a). What followed was a long lasting nationalist hegemony which blocked the articulation of social claims, setting the tone for the mainstream political discourse. It was the National Democrats, already embarking on the project of a fully blown ethnic nationalism (Wapiński 1980), who orchestrated the public debate in subsequent rounds of Duma elections in 1907 and 1912. What tainted this seizure was a widespread deployment of antisemitism and ethnicization of political difference. Political opponents or simply voters of other political parties than Polish nationalists were marked as non-Polish or at least controlled by some alien (usually Jewish) forces (Blobaum 2001; Ury 2012). After the revolutionary surge even the “progressive circles” to an increasing degree accepted the language of the political right. The process went so far that Polish liberals were not hesitant to launch a very particular product of Polish politics, so-called “progressive antisemitism” (Weeks 1995; Krzywiec 2009).

This situation created a twofold, ethicized political cleavage. On the one hand many elite actors claimed the popular contention epitomized in socialism to be manipulated by the Jews. On the other hand, popular classes were successfully mobilized by antisemitic nationalism promising economic triumphs over Jewish competitors. Within this discourse the Jews were rendered as a privileged group, and the working class and peasant antisemitism gained anti-elitist tones of popular self-assertion. These double-bind would have long lasting consequences for the major cleavages within Polish public sphere. Its initial structure, determining the future place and reception of civil society actors, would last along with the hegemony of intelligentsia, successfully carrying its cultural capital through major historical breaches (Zarycki 2003, 2015; Zarycki, Smoczyński, and Warczok 2017).

No wonder that this major ethnic cleavage was successfully used by the right orchestrating also the inter-war political debate. Antisemitic elements were widely exploited to induce patriotic fervor during Polish-Bolshevik war, and willingly used to delegitimize the class left. During the election of the first president of the new-born state, his nationalist opponents turned over backwards to delegitimize his candidacy because of the support of national minorities. The rising hostility lead to his assassination by a self-proclaimed defender of the “Polish majority” (Brykczyński 2016). For years to come, antisemitism was the core of political programs of the
nationalist right, organizing the main divisions on the Polish political scene (Blobaum 2005; Krzywiec 2014; Lipski 2015; Michlic 2006). The struggle over defining the national idea was after all won by the right, even if not holding formal power – the Piłsudski’s regime, especially after his death, drifted in the growing extend to the right (Plach 2006). The idea of citizenship was closely interweaved with the affirmation of the national idea, and the latter was ethnically defined (Wapiński 1991; Kizwalter 1999; Hackmann 2003). This effectively prevented successful class mobilization and democratic mediation of economic interests. As a result, major social demands (as for instance land reform) were left unaddressed also after the reconstruction of the Polish nation state.

**Antisemitic anti-elitism**

They were brought back on the table only after the disastrous WWII catastrophe and later realized from above by the Stalinist state. Although it offered inclusion of the popular classes to the new socialist social imaginary, it nevertheless remained highly hierarchical. On the one hand, in some areas the domination of intelligentsia was maintained, on the other, when it was effectively questioned, the disenfranchised intelligentsia used all the available cultural resources to reproduce classist hatred against the new contenders. This was a considerable fuel for general contempt of the socialist order among the old elites (Lebow 2013; Kizwalter 2014; Zysiak 2016).

At the same time, the ethnic cleavage started to mutate into an imaginary division separating the real Polish nation from its foreign, more and more spectral, Jewish, enemies. The great revolution in property relations after the WWII gave the formerly disenfranchised peasants access to the urban premises and professional positions, as Jewish petit bourgeoisie perished and Polish gentry was expropriated. In popular experience this lumped together former noble classes and even moderately propertied Jews (Kersten 1991; Tokarska-Bakir 2007; Gross and Grudzińska-Gross 2012; Leder 2014). In conditions of poor Jewish populations inconspicuously missing, the way to build the imaginary connection between the Jews and the elites despising the people was now open.

In fact, the government reaction to the Kielce pogrom of 1946 was one of the first bones of contention between the working class constituencies (defending the perpetrators) and the socialist power, allegedly persecuting benign Poles (Kenney 2012). The trope of Judeocommunism (Śpiewak 2012) was a widespread coin in popular anticommunism but it was also fruitfully used
in an inner-party struggle, marking an important dimension of destalinization, seen as nationalization of the local communism (W. Jedlicki 1962). The most intense revival of this cleavage came about in 1968, when nationalist faction around the first secretary Władysław Gomułka productively used the antisemitic and anti-elitist undertones to launch an anti-Israeli campaign, crush the dissident opposition of leftist Polish-Jewish intellectuals, and simultaneously expel thousands of Jewish Poles from the country (Osęka 2008).

The same dissidents resurfaced to the scene ten years later, however. They had already abandoned the Marxist revisionism, shocked by the excesses of popular politics which so easily had turned into antisemitic outbursts (Gawin 2013; Siermiński 2016). Meanwhile, workers suffered economic hardship and political violence under first secretary Edward Gierek’s crisis management in the 1970’s. The dissident intellectuals embraced them not only with guidance but also direct support, successfully overcoming the isolation of scattered oppositional cliques. The core of the Workers’ Defense Committee (Komiter Obrony Robotników – KOR) were highly educated Polish-Jewish intellectuals self-consciously stylizing themselves as taking the baton of the radical intelligentsia from the tsarist times (Friszke 2010; Arndt 2013). This created a unique feedback loop between working class constituencies and the self-proclaimed intelligentsia leadership.

Both groups joined forces in an unexpected, yet short lived, bridge between intellectuals and working class protesters who merged in a common social movement of the first Solidarity. It was a singular moment when the class-cultural cleavage was effectively questioned and overcome. There is no single answer to the question to what extend Polish massive oppositional movement of the early 1980’s was created by workers or by intellectuals – it was rather an intense cross-class alliance changing in real time and haunted by numerous tensions (Kennedy 1991a). The working class input was much larger than most of the intellectuals have been ready to admit or even capable to notice (Laba 1991). Nonetheless, the intellectuals were able to give the protest a universalist momentum and secured its recognition as an act of general resistance of historical significance, and not a protest of particular regional or professional group. The scale of the movement and proportion of popular participation was unique in Eastern Europe, also among the cases investigated here (Bernhard 1993).

A previously very hierarchical political field underwent a cultural modernization and democratization of sorts. Workers acquired languages of description of their situation, voicing
protest and articulating their political strives in new ways (Staniszkis 1984). The concepts allowing for more abstract articulation were delivered by oppositional intellectuals. They were, however, no longer using heterodox Marxist parlance as a dozen of years before. Now it was the universalist discourse of human rights and moral truth opposing totalitarianism which guided self-understanding of the protesters (Ost 1990; Gawin 2013). Soon, the long enduring curse of paternalism stroke back, however.

Already during the negotiations with the government in 1980 there was a noticeable tendency to alienate workers from their protest for the sake of more “rational” action of the intellectuals. The latter found an unexpected common ground with the government officials with whom they often shared an elite social background (Staniszkis 1984). This discrepancy between intellectuals and the people grew as the mass movement started to dissolve and gradually lost popular support. Already in 1981 Solidarity lost control over the strikes, and the government accused the disorders for the economic hardships. When General Wojciech Jaruzelski introduced the martial law in 1981, he yet again drawn from the nationalist legitimacy of the state to pit both factions of the opposition against each other. Solidarity lost much of its popular support, and its intellectual leaders the faith in the popular classes (Mason 1985). In the mid. 1980’s it was already clear that they were ready to one more time patronize workers and decide about the wise policies above their heads (Ost 2005).

Civil society in transition

Interestingly, in the days of genuine cooperation with the workers, Solidarity intellectuals were not using the term civil society as a form of self-description. They described their practice in the neo-republican discourse instead. Only later, along with transnational cross-fertilization with the Western intellectuals, they reconceptualised their past practice as civil society (Arndt and Gawin 2008; Załęski 2012). Civil society was a term already signifying their political transformation concerning the inter-class communication and political goals. It was later used as one of the keywords legitimizing the transformation after 1989. The same intellectuals and higher echelons of Solidarity labour union decided to unfold a “protective umbrella” over harsh measures applied during the transition into market economy. This transformation begs for explanation against the backdrop of their previous ideological choices.

The previous idiom of thinking and speaking forged against the socialist government was
grounded in “life in truth” paradigm. This moralized critique assumed a direct access to knowledge, which later made it difficult to accommodate political conflict. Popular protesters on the streets (Ekiert and Kubik 2001) were easily delegitimized as uttering just ungrounded demands of the dark masses not understanding the rationality of transition and their own interests. Liberal elites sided frantically with market reform, acting not only against interest of the working class constituencies which brought them to power, but also flipping sides in favor of strong discourse of class hatred and fear of the masses (for instance their flagship journal Gazeta Wyborcza spearheaded condemnation of economic strikes in the 90s). The role of the self-proclaimed ensigns of civil society and of the term itself was not limited to facilitating this change.

The transition was negotiated among the state-socialist and oppositional elites. The state-socialist past was declared to be separated from the future by a “thick line”. This allowed the post-communist elites to soon establish new careers. The place they created for themselves was directly backed up by the notion of civil society. The term was willingly used by the state-backed press just before the transition, creating a space for semi-state organizations where former apparatchiks might find stable positions (Łoś and Zybortowicz 2000; Załęski 2012).

Meanwhile, actual grass-root organizations of socialist provenience, which created numerous spaces for civic activity and self-expression for the popular classes, were either smashed by austerity measures or largely delegitimized as unwanted, non-transparent residues of the past. Participants and members of those institutions – from local village woman circles, to township houses of culture, to various clubs and associations attached to larger factories, lost their filiation and funds. It happened regardless of the fact that those institutions were usually “political at the top and non-political at the bottom” (Buchowski 2004, 81). Adding insult to an injury, their members were mocked and despised as passive soviet people or victims of the socialist propaganda (Hann 1992).

All in all, the concept of civil society was an important ideological token after 1989. In the same time its previous referents (dissident organizational culture) vanished rapidly as they were defined largely relationally against the (socialist) state (Ost 1990; Hackmann 2003). In new circumstances, proponents of this discourse were legitimizing the new capitalist state and were no longer interested in actually building the independent sphere of debate. Neither were they willing to support actually existing practices of the (post-socialist) civic cooperation. Both tasks were
They targeted the post-communist elites and their civil society, and offered grass-root participation at the same time. There was a tradition to build upon, as late 19th century civic activity in the name of the nation (“organic work”) had had its nationalist variety (Janowski 2003). The right-wing political milieus to some extend appropriated the term civil society as their own, signifying a “genuine” citizens’ activity (Gawin and Gliński 2006). Yet again the idea of civil society appeared to be entangled with the national idea as directed against the state and dedicated to build the national strength in conditions of danger (Hackmann 2003), this time associated with post-communism but also Westernization and the global crisis of values.

This coincided with more general demise of recognition toward the working class. Workers were not only massively sacked (Tittenbrun 2007; Karpiński et al. 2013). They were also deprived of symbolic significance and basic human dignity, they used to have under state socialism (Dunn 2004). Yet again blocked channels of class-based political articulation prevented the emergence of political constituencies capable of effective resistance (Mrozowicki 2011). The badly hurt dignity and search for at least symbolic self-assertion in times of economic hardships turned back the popular classes from liberal politics (Ost 2005).

Political elites, post-communist and post-oppositional alike, were able to keep the unwanted populist nationalism, with its anti-Jewish and anti-Intellectual elements, at bay for some time. Nonetheless, it lived on the margins of the political scene, and in deeper commitments of large populations (Zubrzycki 2006; Tokarska-Bakir 2008; Nowicka-Franczak 2017). The mainstream political scene was in fact structured by the ethnic definition of the nation (Zubrzycki 2001), which provided a feeding soil for its rapid transformation to the right. Popular classes did not regain the much wanted dignity even during economic upswing, while still subjected to highly unequal and condescending workplace cultures and patronizing attitudes of the liberal elites (Burszta et al. 2017). These emotions and demand for equality, at least within the homogenous body of the nation, were successfully addressed by the present right wing government.

Civil society captured

This narrative presentation allows me to now fill in the tiered model of societal structure conditioning the historical functioning of civil society. The presented analysis demonstrates what
was the historical structural embedding of civil society institutions.

![Graph 2](image)

The field of power in the Polish case is highly intelligentsia centered. Most of the struggles are culture-center “fratricidal” struggles of the intelligentsia (Zarycki, Smoczyński, and Warczok 2017). Within the public sphere populated by the members of the intelligentsia, historically civil society was fairly exclusionary and positioned in stark opposition to the working class and peasant constituencies. The elites vs. the people cleavage was willingly used by various factions of the intelligentsia to delegitimize opponents or by newcomers in order to secure a place for themselves. This cleavage often assumed a mantle of toying with popular antisemitism (1912, 1922, 1956, 1968).

Post-transformation civil society practice was highly fractured. Liberal elites did not recognize the role of provincial, grass-root and post-socialist associational culture. This alienated its practitioners and further directed them against civil society of liberal NGO’s perceived as
elitist and foreign-driven, part and parcel of liberal establishment. The actual deployment of the very term civil society in the public discourse, widely used as a tool for the disenfranchisement of popular classes whose cultural capital was not complicit with the visions of liberal modernizers, and simultaneously to create a space of action for liberal, post-dissident and post-communist elites alike, only made things worse.

This situation was easily used by the right wing intelligentsia, coopting the popular classes in their populist project bringing the promise of an imaginary equality within the national body politic. Civil society was easily associated with the negatively evaluated pole of the populist-nationalist discourse. It was invested, not with actual relevance for civil society as practice, with components such as foreignness, non-Polishness, exclusionary elitism and serving external interests (O’Neal 2017). The foreign/cosmopolitan/Jewish element is exploited not only because unresolved antisemitic legacies but also the long-term struggle for national self-assertion and weak programmatic identities of political parties (Korycki 2017). In sub-imperial contexts, often the field of power is structured by the opposition between comprador elites of sorts and the (often self-proclaimed) defenders of national sovereignty (Steinmetz 2008; Go 2008).

The still present ethicized idea of national community delivered a discursive reservoir to imply that civil society, especially in cases of foreign donors involved, acts against the Polish national community. On the one hand, the older patterns of argumentation (history of antisemitism, anti-elitist discourse) are now recirculated in order to assist in the present deligitimization of civil society organizations. On the other hand, the actual role of civil society – as class-embedded practice and as an ideologically laden term – shed light on the backdrop for success of these argumentative strategies.

Its discursive, movable perception can be illustrated with a “tennis ball” model. I propose to see it as visual representation of civil society within discursive battles in the field of power. Objects in the field are perceived differently from different standpoints (roughly ideological worldviews). Simultaneously, the drawing is a representation of a sphere – the viewer can grasp the location of objects only imperfectly. As with maps representing the globe, the place of the viewer and convention of representation creates a parallax effect, a distortion. And this illustration should be taken just like this – as representing both relational ontology of the field of power, positionality of actors and their perspective, and last but not least the epistemological distortions of the analytical view. This picture is subject to structured gaze of (liberal) academic
observation and represents positions of actors within the field of power as seen by the right-wing populist standpoint – thus it represents an actually existing background for the discourse ostracizing civil society.

![Diagram](image)

It is a tennis ball because of the type of suture of the flat material used to construct a sphere. There just two pieces of material and these two plains of the material are continuous. Thus, the analytical gaze of the academic observer “knows” that the upper and bottom parts are intimately connected, as actual threats for the domain represented by the intelligentsia. Upper part is to large extent an ideological misrepresentation, the bottom a structural actuality of class society, but realms cannot be neatly separated. Both of them are policed out from the horizontal realm on
both sides of the vertical division left-right and help to constitute its border (suture of two plains). The liberal-nationalist division is staged as conflicted along the cultural lines but after all both sides share a common structural embedding.

**Dual social structure and fractured elites – Hungary**

History of Hungarian society and politics, like in the Polish case, has been shaped by a relatively numerous noble class. Whereas in Poland the wide group of middle gentry shaped the long lasting and influential ethos of the intelligentsia, in the Hungarian case the legacy of the nobility was crucial for cultural patterns prevalent among urban elites. Contrary to Poland, however, the higher echelons of aristocracy remained influential for the state structure and actively shaped political divisions. The reason was a larger degree of state autonomy in the crucial period of the modern state formation.

The aristocracy widely sided with the Habsburg state and often chose Catholicism as their religion, in compliance with the official religion of the Habsburg monarchy. It later supported conservative political forces and the imperial idea, whereas the gentry remained the hotbed of Hungarian liberal nationalism. This liberalism had its limits, however, and the Hungarian national project willingly excluded numerous national minorities, who in these circumstances supported the supranational aristocratic circles. This division among the elites remained influential and marked the main political camps at least to the interwar period. Within the authoritarian regime, the regent Miklós Horthy, still had to skilfully maneuver between both ideological currents, himself coming from the social milieu bridging the opposite camps (he was a Calvinist noblemen but a loyal admiral in imperial Austro-Hungarian army, see Janos 2012).

**Origins of the dual structure**

While political culture was marked by this division, the distribution of influence did not correspond neatly with the development of the social structure. This mismatch was a result of a double social structure of sorts. New hierarchies and networks of political influence emerged independently and not by transformation of the older order of ranks. In rapidly modernizing urban areas, new values and hierarchies developed parallely to the preserved social world of the landed elites. The cultural exchange between these realms was limited and unidirectional. New urban elites were attracted by states positions, access to which was possible only for Hungarian
noble elites. As a result, new contenders adopted some noble class values (as representational consumption). The modernizing impulses were not transferred back, however. The noble ethos was built around civil service and not commercial activity which remained in low esteem. Commercial elite developed separately, and its occupations were marked as foreign and not so benevolent for the Hungarian society. As a result it did not have significant influence on political power and hierarchy in the public sphere, still controlled by the Hungarian elites, liberal gentry and conservative aristocrats (Hanák 1984; Gyani 2002). This double development had its roots in the national composition of the urban dwellers.

Urban populations were composed in a large extend from German settlers and Jewry. This had an impact on the social composition of the rising commercial elites (Hanák 1984). Both groups assimilated to Hungarianness, often via the gentry’s ethos of the liberal national idea but also conspicuous consumption. They remained hostile to each other, which fanned the flames of antisemitism in urban areas. Not only was it wide spread among German Bürgertum but also among the Hungarian urban dwellers. The former were fearful of new contenders, the latter wanted to self-assert themselves as commercial and industrial elites but faced the already establish Jewish competitors (Szelényi 2006). The result was a high level of political antagonism corresponding to the social origin of particular urban milieus. Liberal and socialist Jewish urban middle class was viciously attacked by the assimilated German and Hungarian supporters of the modern antisemitic right alike.

Meanwhile, the industrial development proceeded in a way disproportionally burdening the popular classes. They were not protected by any extensive measures and did not find substantial political representation. The inflow of capital was often of speculative character and not an organically growing result of industrious spirits. Thus, it was easier to present capitalism as an exploitative manipulation of foreign elements. Consumption of foreign goods complicit with modern standards, but inaccessible for broader populations, and insular investments of imported capital equally contributed to the alienation of the commercial elite from the local society (Janos 2012). Local liberalism was tightly intertwined with nationalism which prevented it from building a platform of support bridging ethnic divisions. Social differentiation overwrote ethnic divisions, hence broader political constituencies aiming at moderate reforms in the name of the general social welfare were hardly possible (Gerő 1995).

In this context an anti-metropolitan (not necessarily strictly rural) national populism
became an important player on the political scene. It encompassed a plethora of political currents. Some of them endorsed pro-peasant rural romanticism, some of them were closer to nativists fascism targeting Jewish capital, which allegedly threatened the existence of Hungarian peasants. The latter groups were not able to build a broader social base while facing ethnically different bourgeoisie, who was obviously not welcome in the volkish Political alliance (Janos 2012). However, the peasant resistance against cosmopolitan, urban ideas, communism and capitalism alike, was an important factor. It contributed significantly to the defeat of the Bela Kun’s Communist republic of 1919. Later it was an important tributary the nationalist, but anti-German current in the last days of Horthy’s rule during IIWW (Trencsényi 2014). Some of the provincial intelligentsia supporting the populist idea played an important role in the anti-communist dissidence after the IIWW.

**Diverging biographies and polarization of the elites**

Hungarian communist party, which seized power after IIWW, was not particularly intellectualized. Nonetheless it attracted intellectuals, especially in the first period of its rule. Communist rule in Hungary could boast important improvements in social welfare and industrial development. Like in Poland, it confronted various old elites dissatisfied with the new order. The main problem, however, was a growing gap between triggered consumerist aspirations and a drive to self-assertion among new professional elites – in a large part educated already in the socialist state. State-supported modernization created a class whose aspirations could not be easily satisfied. The state could not keep up with them bound with ideological rigidity and requirements of militarized Soviet geopolitics (Tökés 1996). These professional circles were one of the main pillars of the anti-regime opposition. This process was detected early by the very same dissidents (Konrád and Szélényi 1979). Meritocratic professionals attempted to find their way in the system by cooptation or opposition, depending on circumstances. They did not stopped on seizure of the party structure, but finally replaced the party as such (Falk 2003).

Also among socialist working class the aspirations grew. Although Janos Kadar took power in 1956 as a political ally of the Soviet hardliners, he was able to buy social piece only for the price of broad economic concessions to the mass consumerist society in socialist style. Consumerist aspirations loomed large after the regime chose the promise of welfare as a legitimization strategy. The legal and economic framework and regime tolerance allowed pockets
of market exchange to function and facilitated semi-legal privatization of small amounts of public assets. Hungarian working class was more individualized and because of the regime laxity motivated to seek material satisfaction rather via individual strategies than collective protest (Bartha 2013). Thus, contrary to Poland, there was hardly any mass resistance and no inter-class alliance of intellectuals and workers was formed.

The transition was conceived among the intelligentsia, who also constituted the post-transition parliament, even less variegated in respect to class than in Poland (Kennedy 1992). Despite similar class origin, the dissident milieus in Hungary were much diversified, however. Perhaps more important from standard political differences was the split between so called urbanists and populists (Szabo 2004).

The former were urban (mainly Budapest) based elites, often with Jewish background and history of involvement in communist party. Coming out from Marxism, not always did they renounce it straight away, as some of the Polish revisionists. The circle of disciples gathered around renowned Marxist philosopher György Lukács developed a critical variant of Marxism and criticized the nominally Marxist regime. Similarly, figures as Georgy Bence and Janos Kis contributed to the self-understanding of critical Marxism up to leaving it behind entirely (as developed in their book published under pseudonym, see Rakovski 1978). These milieus later constituted the core of the Budapestan liberal-democratic elite.

The populist, in turn, were mostly based in smaller urban centers (division between capital and the rest of cities is very strong in a highly centralized Hungarian state). They cultivated nationalist and agrarian traditions of the interwar and were occasionally coopted by the socialist party by promises of pro-nationalist solutions or cultivation of Hungarian culture among large Hungarian populations left beyond the state borders after the infamous Trianom treaty, concluding the defeat in IWW. This milieu was a backdrop for nationalist populism which dragged through mud and mire occidentalist modernizers, wide-spread among Budapestan liberals. Certainly not only nationalist convictions and ideological commitments but also resentment against the self-appointed elites residing in Budapest contributed to this hostility, perhaps more than anti-Jewish prejudices directed against the same liberal elites (Kennedy 2002). Only occasionally the opposition against the socialist state unified those circles, but indeed there were personalities able to build bridges between them, as for instance a sharp, yet understanding cultural critic Istvan Bibo.
This division was to play an important role on the post-communist political scene. Two, post-dissident parties were formed. One, the Alliance of Free Democrats was mostly metropolitan, liberal-democratic, and after all more willing to cooperate with post-communist socialists. Another, Hungarian Democratic Forum, initially explicitly drawing from rural-national populist movement, was appealing to nationalist sentiments. It was later successfully hollowed-out and practically retaken by Fidesz (Falk 2003). The urbanist-populist divide was revived as a new cultural cleavage in the early 1990’s (Bozóki 1999), and to some extend later after 2000, when a technocratic consensus build by the ruling socialist party withered away. This cultural cleavage found also an interesting recodification in the presence of antisemitism in the current Hungarian political debate.

Earlier, pre-IIWW antisemitism was often direct means of expression for antimodernist political convictions. The urban Jewry indeed historically played an important role in the implementation of Western values in Hungary. It was often associated with Westernization and unwanted cosmopolitanism, liberalism or communism, endangering the specific qualities of the Hungarian nation. This traits resurfaced in the debates between urbanists and populist but not necessarily expressing directly the anti-modernist agenda. The exclusionary discourse closing Hungarianness against external influence recirculated old tropes to perpetuate the flames of discourse of national sovereignty, self-asserting itself against foreign enemies.

In addition, however, the conflicted intellectual elites were not able to create positive political programs different enough to grip the voters. As a result, the polemic was moved to the terrain of memory and identity conflict. It widely used antisemitism as a token of political allegiance, one of the “historical and ideological symbols to distinguish themselves from one other” (Kovács 2011, 189). The symbolic domain became the principal arena for constructing party identity among intellectuals. “[T]he language of the “Jewish question” — which in previous decades had already served to express beneath the surface the self-identity of the various intellectual camps — soon became the language of the identity discourses and rapidly became embedded in the political context” (Kovács 2011, 189). Thus, the “Us” and “Them” dichotomy denoted not strictly speaking modernist and anti-modernist cultures but “definable intellectual groups”; antisemitism functioned as a code of political identity rather than as a cultural code of anti-modernity. This contributed further to the polarization of the elite.
**Elites and class power**

All these conflicted groups, however, were not free of predicaments typical for detached thinking of powerless oppositional circles. Their receipts, as life in truth, had been good slogans against the hollowed language of state socialism, but poor instruction for doing real politics once they were finally able to do so. Their thinking was heavily infected with prescribed dogmatism and elitist moralizing and was often ineffective, or even harmful, in new realities. Many of them adored the ethos bordering the idea of philosophers-kings – enlightened, educated elite who lead its people to the new, unknown word. This was only partially counterbalanced by the fact that they accepted popular legitimization and democratic control as necessary requirements of a good rule (Falk 2003). Such mode of thinking was often a burden after transition and certainly did not help to legitimize their initiatives among broader social groups. Also material differences deepen the rift between intellectual elites and popular voters.

New patterns of wealth distribution placed many of former intellectuals in privileged positions. Who benefited from the transformation were the groups able to transform their political connections into economic assets. It was not possible for all formerly privileged party members, and not limited to them. What enabled a transfer of political position into economic opportunities was cultural capital. These were urban, educated party elites, technocratic specialist and some urban based dissidents who were able to do this, but not political functionaries in the narrow sense or provincial elites clinched in the anti-state resistance (Eyal, Szelényi, and Townsley 2000). Once established as new economic elites, either through seizure of industrial assets or careers in media, these milieus lost connection with conditions of existence of broad populations still entrenched in post-transition misery.

Such a situation was not only predicted by critical intellectuals but consciously supported by some oppositional groups, explicitly aiming at meritocratic self-assertion of the professional elite (Lomax 1997b). There was no betrayal of intellectuals as in Poland where inter-class alliance was broken (Kennedy 1991b; Ost 2005), but just “intellectuals on the road to class power” as the title of the famous book on the problem announced (Konrád and Szelényi 1979). In many cases those fighting for democracy were actually contemptuous toward the people and wanted to carefully police out the unwanted elements of uneducated mob from participation in the public sphere. What perpetuated the idea of civil society was often the idea of civil participation limited to the republic of owners. The inclusiveness of those ideas was highly
limited to the propertied and educated (Lomax 1997b, 1999).

Such elitist political imagination was not without its counterpart on the ground. Actual political practice of NGO’s, even if run not by the same intelligentsia pundits, was also detached from many social groups and not free of condescending assumptions about them. The spatial distribution of civil society development corresponded with metropolis vs. provinces division. The vast majority of powerful organizations with considerable budgets concentrated in Budapest. Tiny and poor organizations of the provinces hardly counterbalanced this domination. Expressing local strives and interests, they have been often resentful against their more successful counterparts from the capital (Schreier 2016).

**Civil society and political cleavages**

The cultural cleavage between intellectuals neatly resonates with the voting patterns. According to analyzes of voting preferences in Hungary, there are three main cleavages dividing voters and hence political programs capable to mobilize them. These divisions are religiosity vs. secularism, post-communism vs. anticommunism, and urban vs. rural. They do not crisscross each other but create a bipolar division, very difficult to disentangle. They are not grounded in economic position and therefore make uttering economic arguments difficult. This in turn easily prevents serious mobilization around redistributive policies. The success of the Fidesz party was to a large extend grounded in evolution form appealing to an identity voter focused on nationalist agenda and historical traumas, to a more general voter interested in self-assertion of national identity and attracted by promises of some redistributive measures supporting Hungarian families, which were absent before (Mesežnikov, Gyârfášová, and Smilov 2008). At the same time, polarization of the elite along the same lines, contributes to its tight relationship with the politicians.

There are very few intellectual leaders independent of political parties or circles. Due to the particularities of the privatization process in the 1990s. Hungarian-owned large corporations are scarce. Just like during the 19th century industrialization, getting wealthy by rent-seeking has been much easier than achieving actual market success. Thus many successful business owners are attached to (or, before Fidesz took control in 2010, were attached) political parties. The intelligentsia and the cultural elites had little choice but to turn to these “ politicized financiers”. As a consequence, many business and intellectual elites are dependent on the state and cannot
contribute to or criticize policy-making. This also has an effect on CSOs: fulfilling the role of ‘watchdogs’ and ‘gatekeepers’ in a heavily politicized climate is very difficult, as their actions will be translated as taking a side by one of the parties.2

Political domination and capture of the state by the political force, whose platform was based on the nationalist sentiments, made independent civil society organizations a natural target. It was fully complicit with party official ideology and hence not opposite to the voters’ convictions. In early years of post-communist Hungary, there were significant tax leaves for NGO’s dedicated to boost civic activity envisioned in dissident discourses before. They were widely abused for suspicious business deals, however, and hence it was easy to crack down the civic sphere framing it as rebuilding the rule of law by the state (Vandor et al. 2017). There was no coincidence in the attack on NGO’s launched by Viktor Orban’s government. The structural embedding of CSO facilitated its broader social acceptance. The government successfully framed it as boost in the agency of the state against unwanted, non-national internal enemies and external influences limiting the country’s sovereignty. The government’s discourse created an ideological package, a set of features applied to all civil society organizations regardless of their particular profile, and tainting all of them with the label of alienated from the people, foreign and intransparent. The corresponding structural configuration is illustrated by the graph below.

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2 This paragraph was contributed by Zsófi Bajnay
In Hungary, as in Bulgaria, the sphere of civic activity in socialism was fairly limited and focused differently than Western-oriented political imagination would envision it. The baby was thrown out with the bathwater and the civic sphere was to be built anew after transition. Thus, CSO’s were slotted in a different structural place than in the well-established western democracies. Initially they were supported as fulfilling the ideals of civil society nurtured among intellectuals of post-dissident provenience and western policy makers alike. They indeed promoted liberalism and democracy but in local circumstances this program was fairly political and skewed toward particular ideological option, which by no means remained uncontested. That is why they approached opposition.

As coming from outside, often foreign funded, and underpinned by ideological agendas of their donors, they were not sufficiently integrated into the local social ties. It caused their actual estrangement and watered the mill of critique. They indeed often ignored vernacular contexts and served ideological purposes, which rendered their exclusion much easier. At the same time, they were highly dependent on foreign funds or the state (here situation differed in all three cases), so it was easily to eliminate them or make docile. Keeping a low profile in terms of critical function
towards the state apparatus became a condition of institutional survival and many organizations accepted such necessity (Gessler 2015). Meanwhile, the national government was already strong enough to use state resources and previous experience of political mobilization to build parallel, directly dependent form of civil society.

Already in opposition, the Hungarian right successfully built their own civil society, explicitly putting into practice an import substitution strategy of sorts. Rejecting foreign influences which allegedly endangered national sovereignty, the right boosted the activity of local political circles (so called Civic Circles Movement). These grassroots constituencies were easily mobilized in subsequent elections, partly won landslide by the Fidesz party from 2010 up till 2018. The movement had hegemonic aspirations and was able to stir mass membership mainly among middle-class voters leaving in urban areas beyond the center of Budapest (Molnár 2016; Greskovits 2017). The same logic later urged them create national capitalist class (highly dependent on the state). Both strategies proved successful – Fidesz spectacularly build a state-backed conglomerate of political patronage encompassing business elites and civic sphere, proving to be great inspiration for the Polish right who willingly embarked on a similar project, put into practice even more rapidly.

The problematic legacies of egalitarianism - Bulgaria

The Bulgarian story is also entangled in the post-imperial legacy. This time, however, it is the Ottoman Empire and not (mostly) Russian Empire as in the Polish case, or Austro-Hungarian monarchy marking the Hungarian trajectory. While the Ottoman state was not strictly speaking a re-nationalizing one, it made important imprints on the economic development and the agrarian structure of the Bulgarian lands. In a centralized state there was no strong landed aristocracy, and in Ottoman Bulgaria individual peasant ownership of land existed (Crampton 1983, chap. 10; Todorova 1996). Later, when the Bulgarian state emerged in 1878, many Muslim owners and leasers fled the country and migrated to Turkey, thus allowing even more peasants to establish individual, property based households. The late ottoman economy was far from pre-capitalist subsistence agriculture and it created complex commodity chains and forms of exchange. However, its legacy vanished abruptly after the emergence of the Bulgarian state, along with the imperial administrative structure. Thus, it was subsistence economy of the individual peasant not
much plugged into the market exchange, which marked the future political developments. Meanwhile traditional forms of communal land management and the collectivist ethos of self-sustaining communes long bore their imprint on the rural reality, long after the modern Bulgarian state was created.

Ideas of national revival preparing the independence, germinating from mid-19th century, varied greatly. Some hoped for the liberalization and modernization of the Ottoman empire, while others envisioned armed struggle in the name of democratic nationalism (Daskalov 2004). The social support for these ideas differed, but what unified proponents of reform (more elite) and independence (radical, also church-based, intelligentsia) was their growing detachment from the peasant population.

While earlier the carriers of the national ethos where petty craftsmen and merchants in urban areas under the orthodox millet, in the age of Bulgarian “national revival” (Daskalov 2004) these was the rising intelligentsia who took the baton of the nationalist cause. They were broadening school system and promoted literacy, which allowed the national idea to spread (Meininger 1987). The Bulgarian independence was made possible by a particular alliance of the nationalist intelligentsia and peasant supporters (Crampton 1983, chap. 18). However, once the state was created, and modern but not entirely democratically operating parliament launched (Perry 1993; Kostadinova 1995; Daskalov 2011, chap. 1), positions in state bureaucracy attracted the new men of letters and coopted them to the state structure, unanimously considered a vehicle of modernization (Dimou 2009, 27). As they gained access to lucrative state salaries, the urban, Europeanized intelligentsia became a modern state elite and cut their ties with the peasant constituencies (Crampton 2007, 179). The marriage of convenience which made modern Bulgarian state possible ceased to exist.

**Conspiratory politics in a peasant country**

This created a lacuna in political leadership among the popular classes. It was soon filled by a new group of radical leaders. Because of a similar social structure, the language semblance and a geopolitical alliance, there was a vivid transfer of Russian populist ideas to Bulgaria. It sowed the seeds for the socialist movement and the unique product of the Bulgarian political scene – agrarian party. The socialist movement split in 1903 along the lines similar to those marking other Eastern European controversies. While “the narrows” followed standard Kautskian
orthodoxy (and later formed the Bulgarian Communist Party; Bell 1986), “the broads” tried to build cross-class alliance nurturing an elastic umbrella program of counter-systemic populism (Dimou 2009). Such trajectory was also stimulated under the pressure of the rising agrarian movement.

The Agrarians under Aleksandar Stamboliyski developed an original program combining vast social reforms with the preservation of peasant private property. Their vision of modernization did not exclude progress but aimed at equal redistribution of its cost, possibly little harmful for the agrarian economy. After the defeats in the Balkan Wars and IWW, the agrarian party took power and was able to form a government capable of broad but not always popular reforms (Oren 1973; Daskalov 2011, chap. 2; Trencsényi 2014). Growing dissatisfaction of the urban elites, irritated by redistributive schemes, but above all by measures radically questioning their distinctiveness from the peasant mass (as universal, compulsory labor service), led to a rightist conspiracy which finally took power in 1923.

Uniting urban liberals, right wing corporations, military elites and masonic lodges, this unusual alliance brutally eliminated peasant resistance. Stambolijski was removed from the post of the prime minister and murder. A wave of white terror was launched, especially after communists concluded the bombing of the main church in Sofia, filled in with high-rank officials. Changing governments slowly liberalized, but centrist popular block government was soon removed by another coup d'état in 1934, led by a military-based Zveno conspiracy. Such a juxtaposition of peasant reformers and urban-based conspiracies perpetuated distrust to democratic legitimacy and stimulated thinking in terms of underground networks attempting to seize control over the state and its resources (Crampton 2007).

The military spheres were marginalized after 1935 by King Boris III. He managed to practically outmaneuver major political forces and establish a form of reversed parliamentary monarchy, with the king controlling electoral and decision making processes (Groueff 1997). This tactical maneuvering concerned also international politics. Bulgaria was allied with the Nazi-led axis during IIWW. However, it was not a particularly ardent ally, postponing most of the actual commitments, both in term of war effort and antisemitic persecutions. Nonetheless, this did not prevent Bulgaria to fall under Soviet influence after the war.
This was not entirely staged external seizure of power, however. In fact the Fatherland front uniting anti-fascist forces, and to a growing extend controlled by the communists, enjoyed considerable support among local populations (Bell 1986). It was able to take control over the state under the auspices of the Soviet Union and in much typical way marginalized other political camps up to tightening the grip of Stalinist political order. What is important here, is that the Bulgarian Communist party was quite apt in finding a working synthesis of the soviet model and local political traditions, leading to a successful modernization project.

Stalinism was implemented without a personality cult resonating with the local peasant-based egalitarianism. Todor Zhivkov “normalized” the situation along the agenda of the day in all the Soviet bloc. He built around himself an egalitarian aura and skillfully maintained down to earth communication with the Bulgarian people (Bell 1986; Daskalov 2011, chap. 4). At the same time, agrarian economy was a relatively appropriate place to launch a forceful industrialization. Soviet-style economy worked relatively well here, possibly better than in other allied countries. Bulgaria registered an unprecedented industrial growth and an improvement in modern welfare, in the same time transforming into an urbanized society (Oren 1973). The growth rate slowed down after the world crisis of 1973, but remained a growth, by itself an exception among socialist countries. As a result, the legitimization of socialism was higher in Bulgaria than in other states allied in the Warsaw pact. Ties with the Soviet Union were close, building upon traditional pro-Russian sentiments dating back to the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-78 and the crucial support of Alexander II of Russia for the Bulgarian statehood. Socialism was not perceived as a foreign imposition here.

Conflicts galvanizing public opinion intensified only in the late phase of socialism, when many joined forces to oppose chemical pollution in Ruse and some provincial dissidents resisted the campaign of compulsory nationalization of Bulgarian Muslims in the 80’s (Kabakchieva and Kurzydlowski 2012; Pietrova 2004; Crampton 2007). Finally, these were not social protests which forced Zhivkov to resign, but a palace coup, ironically staged by apparatchiks loyal to Kremlin, now choosing more liberal line of perestroika and glasnost.

Captive civil society

In these circumstances, civil society institutions in a modern sense were in Bulgaria a
relatively late acquisition. Admittedly, there were alternative forms of grass roots activism which should not be dismissed out of hand. For instance, associational sphere connected with various journals or centralized voluntary organizations (as network of village cultural centers, ‘Chitalishte, the Bulgarian Red Cross, Hunters’ or War Veterans’ associations) was flourishing after the creation of the Bulgarian state, especially in the interwar period (Valkov 2009). Just like in Poland, there were profiled organizations in the post-1945 socialist Bulgaria, even if “political at the top”, facilitating voluntary activity at the bottom. However, they were in disarray after 1989 and especially after the 1997 crisis and austerity measures, and did not pose a background for successful implanting of western patterns.

Unlike in Poland and Hungary, there was no strong dissident milieu contesting the socialist regime. The rapid industrialization meant that there were little bourgeois urban milieus with preserved elements of pre-war public culture, which would possibly stimulate resistance. Perhaps for these reasons the opposition was rather meek. The regime was able to “bribe” artists and intellectuals by giving out state posts and creative funds which successfully disciplined dissidence. The local intellectual milieus where rather coffee house circles and not mass movements breeding future civic sphere or political organizations. Political dissidence was limited to singular persons as the future president Zhelyu Zhelev, who wrote a book on fascism, actually a coded depiction of socialist authoritarianism. In strong contrast with the Polish case, there was no larger working class base for oppositional movements. Also bridging between the capital city elites and struggles in the provinces was much weaker.

There was a stark contrast between Sofia-based intellectuals and the more spontaneous activism from the countryside. The former often combined allegiance and criticism towards the socialist government, and actively took part in the state-sponsored public debate, the latter focused on particular issues important for local communities. This discrepancy resulted in difficulties to generalize particular protests in a way gaining public attention. This further contributed to mutual distrust and stereotyped images of both groups (Pietrova 2004). The elite intellectuals, just like in Poland and Hungary, were often stemming from the party elite. Unlike in the other cases, however, they remained directly connected with the party structure. This affiliation offered them resources indispensable for critical reasoning and certain degree of immunity, in the same time cutting the squares of their radicalism. These intellectuals were part and parcel of the Eastern European intelligentsia – they had similar vision of enlightening the
people from above.

When discourses of civil society started to penetrate this milieu, they were not necessarily interested in its augmentation. Instead they wanted to proselytize the idea above the heads of those actually involved in various types of activities, not always fitting to the imaginations of the intellectuals (Kabakchieva and Kurzydlowski 2012). The bridging of this gap was also delayed as the penetration of the country by various forms of Western-style civil society practice was delayed and weaker than in the previous cases.

**The double edge of anti-corruption initiatives**

The reason was atypical pathway of the transition. After post-1989 political liberalization, the oppositional parties took power but were reluctant to introduce rapid economic reforms, which they would not be able to fully control. Being a motley crew of oppositional political forces, they lacked stable majority and substantial legitimacy which prevented them from taking any strong course of action. Later the post-communist formation got back to parliamentary seats and economy was only moderately modified, while revalorized state servants’ salaries and subsidies for post-socialist companies were kept intact. This model crashed only in 1997 and the reforms were introduced, taking their toll on welfare of the vast populations of the country (Crampton 2007). In the meantime, the post-communist governments were able to secure privileges for former party elites, carefully addressed transfers of state resources and some stability for broader populations. The corollary of this situation was a growth of semi-legal business oligarchies tightly controlling the state and facilitating corruptive practices. Dissolution of this compound was a significant political challenge and made anti-corruption a pivotal element in Bulgarian political discourse, with much consequential outcomes.

This discourses found vivid resonance in broader political rhetoric. The newest trajectory of ups and downs of different political projects in Bulgaria shed light on line of divisions structuring the political sphere. Contending political newcomers varied from liberal populism of the movement of the royal heir Simeon II, celebrating a short-lived heyday in early 2000s, through nationalist populism of Attaka, to center-right anti-corruption platform of Boiko Borisov. All these formations contested ossified political divisions and successfully mobilized populist sentiments directed towards established elites. They all built political support on a specific form of post-transition revisionism. It did not target the unequal distribution of costs and benefits, but

While the best receipt for political success is a promise of fighting corruption, all the players, including the former suspects of this rhetoric, realized the payoffs. Effectiveness of anti-corruption measures was lost, as competing networks of actors (in the police, the judiciary and the political sphere) sought to strengthen their own institutional positions. Mutual accusations muddied the waters in a way which removed credibility from any actual revelation of corruptive practices. Anybody may be accused of corruption and many illicit connections are suggested, also by actors operating on the problematic borderland of state and business spheres (Ragaru 2010). They explicitly aim to delegitimize watch-dog organizations or environmentalist causes by suggesting their corruptive character serving foreign interests.

**Civil society as parasitic oligarchies**

Against this backdrop, the history of the civil society and its opponents is much more understandable. The grass-root environmentalist protest was important to undermine the legitimacy of the socialist regime – as in the renowned case of air pollution in Ruse. Later, however, it lost momentum, being perceived as oppositional to developmental goals and material aspirations of the post-communist society. While the power elite was focused on curious economic interest, broader populations were busy with getting by and securing basic material welfare. This lacuna was filled in by foreign-sponsored civic organizations who assumed the mantle of supporters of environmentalist causes and transparent democratic procedures. Their structure and operations were often sub-optimal in allocation of resources, especially when seen against the backdrop of the Bulgarian society struggling to meet their ends meet.

This dynamic contributed to their social alienation, willingly supported by some media outlets describing the NGO’s as foreign interventions. Meanwhile, powerful actors in public discourse were able to present oligarchic interests as boosting economic growth. In consequence, actors resisting the capture of the state and destruction of natural resources were seen as foreign-sponsored agencies endangering Bulgarian sovereignty and possibly “corrupted” by foreign donors or international bodies (Giatzidis 2002). Interestingly, such strategy of delegitimization against all sorts of protest was widely used by the state structure already when the post-
For instance, protesters against ecologically destructive water-pipe construction near Sofia in the 1990s were presented in official media outlets as opposing public interest and modernization goals. They were accused of representing foreign interests (sometimes curious enough – as Greek conspiracy aiming to deprive the population of Sofia of water supplies). Media willingly assisted, presenting protesting groups in unfavorable light, and alienating civic disobedience from broader social support. This contributed to the growing reservations against any NGO practice critical toward the state or commercial activity. Very early, the trope of involvement of foreign donors, explicitly mentioning George Soros, was exploited in the local media (Daînov, Garnizov, and Zanev 1998). Also after intense 2013 protests, the government, now center-right, accused the protesters of being foreign agents, coining the curious libel “sorosoids” (Vandor et al. 2017).

At the same time, the legitimacy of NGOs was undermined by their actual penetration by oligarchic structures, widely using them for money laundering or frauds in the 1990s (Triffonova 2005). Thus, civil society was accused both of serving foreign interests and being embedded in corrupted, domestic political culture, depending on circumstances and political provenience of the accusations. As a result, civil society institutions enjoy exceptionally low level of social trust in comparison to other investigated states, but also while related to other institutions within Bulgaria (Raichev and Todorov 2006, 350). The place of civil society in the public debate and its structural underpinning may be illustrated as follows.
These controversies about civil society were additionally reshuffled by untypical development of political antagonism during the 2013 protests in Bulgaria. The delineation of the boundaries of legitimate belonging to civil society have become a highly contested issue. Those boundaries were drawn along class, aesthetic, epistemic and ethnic lines. “Civil society” became a self-applied label, drawing from one of the literal meanings of the term, i.e. this relating to civility. Civil society started to signify “the cultured domain of the greatest distance from material necessity and need”. The middle class antigovernment protesters used it as means to delegitimize other groups (constituting the body of pro-government counter-protests) as uncultured, uneducated and misguided in a way excluding them from the realm of citizens who are entitled to take part in the public sphere. What emerged after this redescription was a tripartite division no longer limited to the populist move pitting the oligarchic power against the people. Now the latter is also divided between civil society of the new bourgeoisie and constituencies excluded along the class and ethnic lines (Tsoneva 2017). This recirculation of the fear of the masses, discourses depriving the popular classes of political agency by implying external manipulation is supplemented by racialization of political difference. This demonstrates
diverging possibilities in constructing political divisions, dependent of historical contexts. At the same time, self-assertion of liberal civil society as a political identity may easily contribute to even easier attack on civic activity by political parties representing those excluded from such an elitist vision of civic activity.

**Conclusions from comparison**

The aim of this paper was to understand the present attacks on CSOs in Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria. The means to do this was a historical analysis of unfolding pathways of civil society and public sphere in these three cases. All of them share some common characteristics widely present in the region. They are entangled in imperial legacies of three great transnational empires, Russian, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman, respectively. The modern national statehood was created relatively late. Thus local elites were busy with national self-assertion and nurtured irredentist ideals, sometimes envisioning the rebirth of the people from below (Poland and Bulgaria), but nevertheless carefully weeding off political conflict which could weaken the national strives. Along with high ethnic differentiation, this prevented the class cleavage to emerge as a paramount political problem and inhibited creation of class-based parties effectively struggling for welfare provisions on the parliamentary forum. In many other states this was the condition for development of democratic bargaining and enhanced civic cooperation bridging vertical and horizontal social divisions.

With a partial exception of Hungary, there was no strong urban bourgeoisie, which would facilitate liberal ideas of inclusive associational culture, or at least delivered patterns of sociality possible to be implemented among other social groups, as sometimes happened with the associational life of the working class (Kocka et al. 2001). In the region scrutinized here, there was hardly any mediation between the groups previously forming agrarian societies, apart from patronizing practice of the intelligentsia, usually descending from the impoverished noblemen (especially in Poland). The unbridgeable gap between landed gentry and peasantry (here Bulgaria being the odd case) prevented the emergence of vertically bridging forms of civil society. In the same time ethnic differentiation and nationalist conflicts prevented more horizontal forms of cooperation to flourish. Even if sociometric differences are sometimes overcome in the civic sphere, this requires low cultural barriers between the groups – here they were exceptionally high (ex. between peasants and nobles or Poles/Hungarian and Jews).
If only civil activity flourished, it was not launched as a counterbalance to the state. It was either directly oppositional, i.e. founded not as a parallel alternative but as an active actor questioning the state, or directly concessioned by autocratic administration. This was the case in the imperial period, which lasted the longest in the Polish case (up to 1918). However, the situation did not change much later. All three interwar states were authoritarian for most of their existence. This pitting of civic activity against the state, and other way around, continued under state-socialism. The space of action for independent civil society was slightly broader in the cases where bourgeoisie or independent proletarian culture had been stronger before (Hungary and Poland, see Pollack and Wielgohs 2004).

Looking at the problem from the other side, in all three cases the state-supported civic culture, which offered some possibilities for participation, was practically abolished and even ridiculed after 1989. Wester-type of civil society was created from scratch and at the same time served ideological purposes and supported particular political solutions. Along with the crisis of the state after 1989 and actual penetration of some CSO’s by commercial interests of dubious provenience, the credibility of NGO-based civil society was severely undermined.

In all cases argumentative packages used to discredit civil society are different, however. One may try to refer their resonance to the historical developments in respective cases. In the Polish case the post-feudal political division was remobilized along the antisemitic lines. Legacies of anti-elitist antisemitism and ethnic definition of the nation facilitated an easy ethnicization of Political difference by the nationalist right. Political opponents are still implicitly described as non-Polish, which serves purposes of the nationalist faction of the intelligentsia – post-noble class formation still laying a leading role in the Polish public sphere. This matrix was reactivated facing global economic forces and supra-state political agencies as the EU. Civil society sphere was also easily divided between the “non-Polish” enemies serving foreign interests, and organizations tightly bound to support particular goals of the nationalist right.

In the Hungarian case, the elites are also highly polarized. The historical legacy of noble class domination and ethnic nationalism is in many respects similar. The cultural cleavage is more inward, however. The dual social structure and parallel development of Hungarian urban political culture in respect to the world of agrarian landowners, produced a slightly different outcome than the Polish seizure of the public sphere by the post-noble intelligentsia – ideologically conflicted but recognizing the basic class kinship. The long present division
between populists and urbanists had its antisemitic undertones too, and the attitude toward alleged ethnic others has been an important factor differentiating political programs. At present, this created a context for the attack on civil society similar to the Polish one (but put into practice for longer time already). However, it bears more traces of the state-self-assertion against factors endangering its sovereignty – internally and externally. In this sense, it’s more grounded in institutional drives than symbolic struggles.

Bulgaria is a visibly different case. CSO’s are attacked but more as realizing particular interests of various curious groups, be it local oligarchies or international conspiracies. These attacks are not framed as defence of nation, but more as prevention of illicit interests. The background for such critique may be seen as a side-effect of the lasting culture of egalitarianism. Long history of conspiratory politics and nontransparent proceedings cultivated suspicion against any activity above the ground. More recent wide spread corruption affairs allowed the anticorruption rhetoric to spill over: now it is used by all actors which practically abolished its effectivity. It’s thus easy to accuse CSO’s for illicit practices, conspicuous consumption of funds and inhibiting developmental goals, which are often just commercial interests harmful for environment and local communities. This may be read as a struggle for organization of the new social hierarchy. Without established elites, various groups – from mafia oligarchs to liberal pundits from the CSOs – compete for legitimization as an actual elite within society who easily rejects leadership.
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